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BEYOND NORMS: USING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
TOOLS TO DETER MALICIOUS STATE-SPONSORED
CYBER ACTIVITIES
Kathleen Claussen*
ABSTRACT
In thinking about strategy and doctrine for cyberspace, one cannot ignore
either the cyber domain's interaction with other domains or the applicability of
existing legal tools to address cyberspace issues. This Comment focuses on the
latter and argues that any discussion regarding deterrence and a playbook for
consequences for cyber incidents by state actors ought necessarily to include a
careful examination of existing plays, particularly where those incidents have an
economic component as many do. Focusing on multilateral institutions, regional
and bilateral trade and investment agreements, and unilateral tariff and non-tariff
trade and investment tools, this Comment maintains that current and available
international economic tools offer significant potential to shape cyber activities and
norms and only now are beginning to be deployed this way.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The September 2015 joint statement by Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S.
President Barack Obama declared that each state would refrain from certain
malicious cyber activities' was heralded by some as a meaningful commitment to
The genesis for the essays that comprise issue 32.2 of this Journal was a May 2017 workshop
hosted at Temple University, and co-hosted with Leiden Universitv. Under the theme "Influencing
International Behavior in Cyberspace: Devising a Playbook of Consequences for Cyber
Incidents, " the workshop gathered a broad array of academic and governmental experts.
Participants included representatives of the Estonian, Finnish, and U.S. governments (including
officials from the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the U.S. Trade
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evolving norms regarding appropriate state behavior in cyberspace.2 Shortly
thereafter, other countries made similar announcements jointly with China.'
Commentators remarked on the significance of these announcements suggesting a
change in China's attitude toward malicious cyber activity, even amid some
warranted skepticism. 4 These announcements, while important to the reaffirmation
of norms' and the long-term development of customary international law, are not
enforceable by states or private persons.6 Where a state finds another state acting
inconsistently with their jointly affirmed norms, the aggrieved state may choose to
undertake actions to signal its disagreement, but its legal options for recourse are
limited.
Across national boundaries, scholars and policymakers likewise seek to
enhance these nascent norms that cover many different types of malicious cyber
Representative). All government officials, however, participated in their personal capacitv. As
such, the views expressed in this special issue should not be attributed to any government or
government agency.
* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. Thanks to Duncan Hollis and Eneken
Tikk for providing an opportunity to exchange views on this important issue: Thanks also to
Gary Brown, Jeffrey Dunoff, Harvey Rishikof, and the other participants in the symposium for
their thoughtful comments, and to the members of the staff of the Journal for their helpful edits.
These comments do not reflect the views of the organization with which I have been or am
affiliated.
1. See THE WHITE HOUSE, Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People's
Republic of China in Joint Press Conference (Sept. 25, 2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/ 2 015/09/25/remarks-president-obama-
and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint (detailing the cyber-security agreement between the
United States and China).
2. See David Jackson, Obama, Xi Vow Cooperation on Climate, Cyber Issues, USA TODAY
(Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/09/25/obama-xi-jinping-
china-state-visit-cybersecurity-white-house/7 2 7 89 4 3 6 / (describing various responses to news of
the agreement).
3. See, e.g., Thomas Escritt & Michelle Martin, Ahead of Fractious G20, Germany and
China Pledge New Cooperation, REUTERS (July 5, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
g20-germany-china/ahead-of-fractious-g20-germany-and-china-pledge-new-cooperation-
idUSKBNI9QI6R (describing an agreement between China and Germany); Rowena Mason, Xi
Jinping State Visit: UK and China Sign Cybersecurity Pact, GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/oct/2 I /uk-china-cybersecurity-pact-xi-jinping-david-
cameron (highlighting a new cyber-security agreement between China and the United Kingdom).
4. See Jackson, supra note 2 (presenting both praise and skepticism about the agreement,
including indications from the United States of plans to work with smaller groups of like-minded
partners to develop and shape cyber norms).
5. See Martha Finnemore & Duncan B. Hollis, Constructing Norms for Global
Cybersecurity, 110 AM. J. INT'L L. 425 (2016) (analyzing common themes between cyberspace
norms); Samuel J. Rascoff, The Norm Against Economic Espionage for the Benefit of Private
Firms: Some Theoretical Reflections, 83 U. CHI. L. REv. 249 (2016) (explaining the norm against
economic espionage); Mei Gechlik, Appropriate Norms of State Behavior in Cyberspace:
Governance in China and Opportunities for US Businesses, HOOVER INST. WORKING GRP. ON
NAT'L SEC., TECH., & L., AEGIS SERIES PAPER NO. 1706 (July 28, 2017) (presenting norms of
state behavior in cyberspace).
6. Jason Healey & Tim Maurer, What It'll Take to Forge Peace in Cyberspace, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-
Voices/2017/0320/What-it-ll-take-to-forge-peace-in-cyberspace.
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7
activities. The problem underlying the need for such norms is clear. For years,
cybersecurity firms and some governments have quantified and made public
evidence regarding the breadth and depth of, malicious cyber infiltrations by state
actors into the networks of foreign businesses and other governments.8
In thinking about doctrine to govern cyberspace and strategies to prevent
cyber intrusion, one cannot ignore the cyber domain's interaction with other
domains or the applicability of existing legal tools to address cyberspace issues.
This Comment focuses on the latter. It queries whether international economic law
tools could serve a useful purpose in governing state-to-state cyber interactions, at
least where those interactions pertain to national or international economic
relations.
I argue that any discussion regarding deterrence and a playbook of
consequences for cyber incidents by state actors ought necessarily to include a
careful examination of existing plays, particularly where those incidents have an
economic component, as many do. I maintain that current and available
international economic tools offer significant potential to shape cyber activities and
norms, and only now are beginning to be deployed this way.
The Comment focuses on three areas: first, multilateral institutions and the
potential for their use; second, regional and bilateral trade and investment
instruments; and third, unilateral tools available to the United States in working
with other states on cyber issues. Where the United States and others have begun
to use international economic tools to address cyber issues, I evaluate their success.
State responsibility for economic cybersecurity is a dynamic and rapidly changing
field as states experiment with these mechanisms, and is likely to continue to
change even as this Comment goes to print. Nevertheless, it is useful to take stock
of present and past initiatives with an eye to future potential.
7. See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, China and the US Strategic Construction of Cybernorms:
The Process Is the Product, HOOVER INST. WORKING GRP. ON NAT'L SEC., TECH., & L., AEGIS
SERIES PAPER No. 1704, 2017 (discussing how cybernorms develop and function over time);
Ashley Deeks, Moving Forward on Cyber Norms Domestically, LAWFARE (July 10, 2017, 1:10
PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/moving-forward-cyber-norms-domestically (describing how
to clarify and strengthen norms domestically).
8. See, e.g., MANDIANT, APTI: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA'S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS,
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-aptl-report.pdf (last
visited Mar. 8, 2018) (detailing China's authorization of foreign cyber intrusion); OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA'S ACTS, POLICIES,
AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND
INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (Mar. 22, 2018) (setting out
evidence regarding China's cyber intrusions into U.S. businesses).
9. As Dorothy Denning has written, "Just as any attempt to develop a single deterrence
strategy for all undesirable activity across the traditional domains would be fraught with
difficulty, so too for cyberspace. Yet this is how many authors have approached the topic of
deterrence in cyberspace. Instead, by focusing on particular cyber weapons that are amenable to
deterrence or drawing from existing deterrence regimes, the issues become more tractable."
Dorothy E. Denning, Rethinking the Cyber Domain and Deterrence, 77 JOINT FORCE Q. 8, 8-9
(2015).
2018] 115
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II. OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TOOLS
The focus of this symposium is deterrence, which raises two fundamental
questions: deterrence against what and for whom? Further, the symposium seeks to
design a playbook of consequences: responsive actions that can be taken following
a cyber incident. In this sense, our group study concentrated on post-hoc deterrence
across a wide spectrum of cyber activities directed at other bad state actors. Among
other considerations, the ongoing discussion of cyber norms is intended to clarify
what is appropriate cyber-behavior. Thereafter, when a state acts inconsistently
with agreed norms, responsive actions by other states will deter later
transgressions.
International economic law takes a different view of deterrence. In fact, very
little scholarship speaks to the deterrence elements of international economic law."
To the extent that commentators have focused on deterrence in international
economic law, it is often in respect of a potential chilling effect that certain
international economic law measures could have on regulation."
More attention has been paid in the international economic law regime to
collective action deterrence by way of institutional growth in the last thirty years,
alongside the growth in state cyber capabilities. Where those cyber activities have
economic effects or purposes, international economic tools may provide a space
for engagement with and, in certain cases, enforcement against offending state
cyber actors. For example, among the commitments made by President Xi and
President Obama was a statement that neither country would "conduct or
knowingly support" cyber-enabled theft of trade secrets and confidential business
information "with the intent of providing competitive advantages to their
companies or commercial sectors."1 2 Such activity is directly related to the
economic security of both the United States and China, as well as the transnational
commercial activity of both countries' businesses.
Leaders in the global effort to create norms for cyber activity have had to
confront the same concepts as Frank Easterbrook advanced in a domestic context
in 1996. Easterbrook queried whether new legal concepts were necessary to
govern activities in cyberspace.14 To be sure, my goal is not to cover all the tools
comprehensively, and such a short Comment would not permit me to do so; rather
10. Exceptionally, see Jeffrey Kucik & Krzysztof J. Pelc, What Can Financial Markets Tell
Us About International Courts and Deterrence?, INT'L CTS. & DOMESTIC POL. (forthcoming
June 2018) (describing the examination of deterrence by economic institutions as a novel
approach).
I1. See, e.g., Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings"
Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 39 (2003) (discussing negative effects that regulatory deterrence
may have on the effectiveness of the North American Free Trade Agreement).
12. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping's State Visit to the
United States (Sept. 25, 2015); Barack Obama, President, The President's News Conference with
President Xi Jinping of China (Sept. 25, 2015).
13. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
207 (1996).
14. See generally id.
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I will highlight certain tools, their use and non-use, and the potential for the future.
Further, none of these tools is intended as a panacea for cyber issues. A multi-
layered and comprehensive cyber engagement strategy exceeds the scope of this
paper.
This Part surveys the multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral, and unilateral
institutions available to states that both establish international obligations relevant
to cyber economic activity and provide mechanisms for recourse against states that
violate those obligations. It examines possible and existing tools that would
buttress the normative commitments already in place and that are available to
enforce those commitments.
A. Multilateral Tools
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is likely the most significant
multilateral or international organization for international economic law. The
organization is run by its 164 member governments and administered by a
Secretariat to which those governments have delegated some authority." The
WTO's foundation is a series of negotiated agreements that constitute trade rules
for its members. These agreements start with broad principles for trade and include
sector- or topic-specific rules including for cross-border services and intellectual
property. There is no cyber-specific agreement and there is no doubt that the rules
were not designed with cyber activity in mind. The WTO was created in 1994 at a
time when the potential for cyber activity was largely unknown. Thus, the current
trade rules are not designed to accommodate twenty-first century challenges,
particularly with respect to cyberspace.
A critical component of the WTO-a paradigmatic collective deterrence
institution -is its dispute settlement mechanism. All major world powers are
active participants in the WTO dispute settlement system and, unlike other
international dispute settlement mechanisms, most countries, including states that
are active cyber operators, seek to comply with the WTO dispute settlement
decisions."
15. See generally The WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/thewto e.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) (describing state
membership to the WTO and its operational structure).
16. T.V. PAUL, PATRICK M. MORGAN & JAMES. J. WIRTZ, COMPLEX DETERRENCE:
STRATEGY IN THE GLOBAL AGE 164 (2009).
17. See generally Dispute Settlement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu e/dispu-e.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) (providing
information on the purpose and procedures of the dispute settlement mechanism).
18. See Legal Effect of Panel and Appellate Body Reports and DSB
Recommendations and Rulings, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu e/disp-settlement_cbt_e/c7sIpl-e.htm (last visited
Feb. 24, 2018) ("[T]he conclusions and recommendations ... become binding upon the parties to
the dispute.").
2018] 117
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The WTO provides multiple opportunities for states to consider and deliberate
on problematic domestic legislation and state behavior that relates to trade rules,
including cyber related measures. For instance, in September 2017, at the WTO
Council for Trade in Services, the United States-together with Japan, South
Korea, Austrailia, and Chinese Taipei-criticized as a possible violation of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services China's wide-ranging new cybersecurity
law which required companies to disclose intellectual property to the government
and store data locally to be allowed to operate in China."' China replied that
safeguarding cybersecurity is a legitimate regulatory right for each member.20
Nevertheless, David Fidler maintains that WTO members have not used the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism to address certain cyber harms because of the
"difficulty of formulating claims" that such measures violate WTO agreements.
2
1
Speaking specifically of a potential claim that the cyber behavior of a WTO
member violated a WTO agreement, Fidler argues that "it is not clear that
[another] WTO member could satisfy [the evidentiary] burden" of such a claim
"by relying on evidence from private-sector entities."2 2 As Fidler describes, while
cybersecurity firms like Mandiant have documented malicious cyber-economic
behavior by China, governments have been more guarded.24
B. Regional or Bilateral Tools
Apart from its commitments under the WTO framework, the United States
and most other states also maintain robust regional and bilateral economic
agreements. In the last twenty years, some of these agreements have evolved to
include actionable commitments specific to cyber issues and other commitments
that may be applied to state-attributed cyber harms. I will briefly discuss two types.
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) provide safeguards for investors making
investments in foreign countries. Under the dispute settlement mechanisms of
BITs, an investor may sue an infringing state or a state may sue another state party
to the treaty. No publicly available investor-state decision appears to address cyber
harms.2 5 Further, nothing in the most recent (2012) U.S. Model BIT26 speaks
19. Council for Trade in Services, Communication from the United States: Measures
Adopted and Under Development by China Relating to Its Cybersecurity Law, WTO Doc.
S/C/W/374 (Sept. 26, 2017). See also WTO Members Examine New Proposals
for Domestic Regulation in Services, WORLD TRADE ORG. (July 5, 2017),
https://www.wto.org/english/news-e/newsl7_e/serv_1 Ijull7_e.htm.
20. WTO Members, supra note 19.
21. David Fidler, Economic Cyber Espionage and International Law: Controversies
Involving Government Acquisition of Trade Secrets through Cyber Technologies, ASIL INSIGHT,
Mar. 20, 2013.
22. Id.
23. MANDIANT, APTI: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA'S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS (Feb. 9,
2013).
24. But see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. CHARGES FIVE CHINESE MILITARY HACKERS FOR
CYBER ESPIONAGE AGAINST U.S. CORPORATIONS AND A LABOR ORGANIZATION FOR
COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE (2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-
military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor.
25. Based on a search for publically available investment decisions conducted on October
[32.2118
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specifically to cyber harms, although that would not preclude an investor or state
from bringing a case alleging harm to an investment through cyber intrusion.
Legislation known as Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) 27 serves as the
foundation for all U.S. trade agreements of the last forty years. TPA sets out
objectives and content for inclusion in trade agreements negotiated by the
executive branch with U.S. trading partners. It includes, as of 2015, objectives in
the areas of digital trade in goods and services and cross-border data flows. TPA
seeks "to ensure that governments refrain from implementing trade-related
measures that impede digital trade in goods and services, restrict cross-border data
flows, or require local storage or processing of data." 28 For the first time among
TPA statutes, the 2015 TPA legislation refers to the importance of "preventing or
eliminating government involvement in the violation of intellectual property rights,
including cyber theft and piracy." 2 9 As a result of this inclusion, the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement negotiated by the United States together with eleven other
countries-but from which the United States has now withdrawn-includes robust
electronic commerce and intellectual property chapters, which include specific
provisions on cyber matters.38
The advantage of placing in trade and investment agreements obligations
regarding cyber activity related to cross-border commerce, is that those
commitments are likely enforceable by the parties to the agreement. That is, most
binding commitments in U.S. trade agreements negotiated in recent years include
state-to-state enforcement mechanisms through their dispute settlement chapters.
While the United States has only commenced one dispute settlement proceeding
pursuant to a trade agreement in the last twenty years (on a topic unrelated to cyber
matters), the opportunity would be available where the agreements so provide.
Thus, future trade agreements negotiated under TPA 2015, or future delegations of
authority from Congress following the expiration of TPA 2015, could include the
commitments outlined above, and the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) and other agencies could innovate enforcement measures
against U.S. trading partners.
15, 2017. Some arbitral panels have considered and admitted documents obtained through
computer hacking. See, e.g., Brigitta John, Admissibility of Improperly Obtained Data as
Evidence in International Arbitration Proceedings, KILUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Sept.
28, 2016), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/09/28/admissibility-of-improperly-
obtained-data-as-evidence-in-international-arbitration-proceedings/; Caratube Int'l Oil Co. and
Mr. Devincci Salah Hourani v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/13.
26. U.S. DEP'T ST., U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY (2012),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf.
27. Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No.
114-26 (2015) (TPA was last renewed in 2015).
28. Id. § 102(b)(6)(C).
29. Id. § 102(b)(5)(A)(vi).
30. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, arts. 14, 18, Feb. 2016, New Zealand treaty
depository, available at https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaties/trans-pacific-
partnership-agreement-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership/.
2018] 119
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C. Unilateral Tools
In addition to the multi- and plurilateral commitments described above, U.S.
agencies could unilaterally undertake to use international economic tools codified
in domestic law against offenders in their efforts to enforce cyber commitments. A
trend in this direction began under the Obama administration, and has continued
under the Trump administration.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) maintains numerous sanctions programs that target either countries or
individuals and impose a type of embargo against dealings with those countries or
individuals. The OFAC's authority to impose such sanctions is derived principally
from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which
authorizes the President to impose economic sanctions to respond to a national
31
emergency.
On April 1, 2015, President Obama invoked the IEEPA and the National
Emergencies Act, 32 among other authorities, issuing an Executive Order to create a
sanctions authority to be administered by OFAC for cyber activities. The order
blocks the transfer of property belonging to individuals engaging in "significant
malicious cyber-enabled activities." 4 In the Order, the President concludes that
"the increasing prevalence and severity of malicious cyber-enabled activities
originating from, or directed by persons located . . . outside the United States
constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign
policy, and economy of the United States."3 Emphasizing this link between the
cyber activities of foreign actors and the economic security of the United States
was not a new idea, but to have it highlighted at the highest levels of the
government with significant effect gave the concept renewed authority and license
for economic agencies throughout the government to operationalize cyber-focused
efforts. The order goes on to speak to activities that are reasonably likely to result
in, or have materially contributed to, a significant threat to the "economic health or
financial stability of the United States." 6 Where those activities have the purpose
or effect of "causing a significant misappropriation of funds or economic
resources, trade secrets, personal identifiers, or financial information for
commercial or competitive advantage or private financial gain," the Secretary of
the Treasury is empowered to take action to block the transfer of property of
responsible individuals from within the United States to outside the United States.
31. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1977); see
Perry S. Bechky, Sanctions and the Blurred Boundaries of International Economic Law, 83 Mo.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1) (describing the sanctions and how they operate).
32. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-51.
33. Exec. Order No. 13694, 80 Fed. Reg. 18,077 (Apr. 2, 2015).
34. Id.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id.
37. Id. On December 28, 2016, President Obama issued Executive Order 13757 that
amended the first Order and specifically named several Russian individuals and entities which
were accused of malicious cyber enabled activities. Exec. Order No. 13757, 82 Fed. Reg. 1, 3
(Jan. 3, 2017).
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A significant development between the time of the May 2017 symposium and
the moment this issue will go to press is the Trump administration's move away
from sanctions" and the use instead of a tool from the Trade Act of 197439 (1974
Trade Act) to fight one type of malicious state-sponsored cyber economic activity.
The 1974 Trade Act set up a number of new or revised tools for private
parties to take advantage of the U.S. domestic system where they were aggrieved
by a foreign trade action. President Trump has sought to use Section 301 of the
1974 Trade Act after many years of nonuse. 40 The idea behind Section 301 is to
permit the United States to take action against trading partners that are unfairly
burdening U.S. commerce. According to some observers, its utility today, given
the creation of the WTO, is to bridge the gap between the WTO rules and areas not
covered by those rules. Section 301 also provides an opportunity for members of
the public to force the government's consideration of a trade issue by including a
mechanism for receiving a public petition,42 something that I refer to as an
"enforcement enhancement element," insofar as it permits public prompts for
enforcement rather than leaving the commencement or pursuit of enforcement
entirely to the executive branch.4 3
Although Section 301 is a tool that is employed by the United States acting
alone, the European Union has a similar process. The European Union's analog to
U.S. Section 301 is the Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR)." The TBR establishes a
procedure enabling businesses and E.U. member states to request the E.U.
institutions to examine any trade barriers put in place by non-E.U. states, to
"safeguard the interests of E.U. companies and workers."' To date, the E.U. has
initiated twenty-four cases under the TBR, the most recent of which was initiated
38. However, as of now, President Trump has maintained that there is a national emergency
and that President Obama's Executive Orders are still in effect. See 163 CONG. REC. H2557
(daily ed. Mar. 29, 2017) (statement of President Trump).
39. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618 (as amended through Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141 (Mar. 23, 2018)).
40. See Chad P. Brown, Rogue 301: Trump to Dust OffAnother Outdated US Trade Law?,
PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON. (Aug. 3, 2017, 11:45 AM), https://piie.com/blogs/trade-
investment-policy-watch/rogue-301-trump-dust-another-outdated-us-trade-law (explaining how
the Trump administration can use this section in response to Chinese cyber intrusion).
41. See Bruce Hirsh, Taking Matters into Your Own Hands - Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, TRADE VISTAS (Aug. 3, 2017), https://tradevistas.csis.org/taking-matters-hands-section-
301-trade-act-1974/ (explaining why the United States may consider using Section 301 rather that
the WTO trade dispute mechanism).
42. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618 (as amended), §§ 221-25 (stating
requirements for petition).
43. USTR Announces Initiation of Section 301 Investigation of China, OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Aug. 18, 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/2017/august/ustr-announces-initiation-section.
44. Council Regulation (EC) No. 3286/94 of 22 December 1994.
45. See Eur. Comm'n Press Release IP/12/1390, Commission Proposes Improved Rules to
Enforce EU Rights Under International Trade Agreements (Dec. 18, 2012).
2018] 121
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in 2008.46 Likewise, the last USTR-initiated investigation under Section 301 was
initiated in 2010. Next, I describe how the Trump administration is seeking to use
Section 301 to combat illicit cyber activity by China.
III. CURRENT USE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TOOLS To ADDRESS STATE
CYBER ACTIVITIES
In the last three years, the United States has primarily pursued unilateral
international economic law tools to combat malicious state-sponsored cyber
activities. Applying tools from the international economic law toolkit requires a
whole-of-government approach in which economic agencies collaborate with cyber
experts, including those investigating possible attacks and enforcing criminal or
national security commitments.
In March 2017 and again in March 2018, President Donald Trump announced
the continuation of the national emergency necessitating the cyber sanctions
authority, but the government has exercised its authority sparingly. 47 Thus, the
United States has not used the full extent of its sanctions power to hold
accountable any state actors other than the Russian individuals and entities
believed to be responsible for meddling in the 2016 presidential election and
certain Iranian actors.
To be sure, the specialized cyber sanctions have a limited scope. The two
Executive Orders require attribution to a group or individual. Given that precise
attribution in cyberspace is challenging, the Secretary of the Treasury has the
discretion to rely upon whatever degree or level of attribution he feels appropriate
to exercise the authority accorded him by the president. The attribution analysis
would need to be provided to the Treasury from another part of the government,
requiring both close collaboration and consensus. Further, putting a state-related
entity on a sanctions list-like any action against a foreign state-involves many
political calculations.
It may be that the difficulties associated with applying sanctions led President
Trump, on August 14, 2017, to take a different route in respect to China's cyber-
and other technology-related activities. On that date, by memorandum, the
President directed the USTR to determine in accordance with Section 301 of the
1974 Trade Act "whether to investigate any of China's laws, policies, practices, or
actions that may be unreasonable or discriminatory and that may be harming
American intellectual property rights, innovation, or technology development."48
46. EUR. COMM'N, GENERAL OVERVIEW OF ACTIVE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
CASES INVOLVING THE EU AS COMPLAINANT OR DEFENDANT AND OF ACTIVE
CASES UNDER THE TRADE BARRIERS REGULATION (Jan. 2018),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_ 54243.pdf.
47. 163 Cong. Rec. H2557 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2017) (statement of President Trump
maintaining the national emergency declared by President Obama); THE WHITE HOUSE, NOTICE
REGARDING THE CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO
SIGNIFICANT MALICIOUS CYBER-ENABLED ACTIVITIES (Mar. 27, 2018).
48. Donald J. Trump, Presidential Memorandum for the United States Trade Representative
(Aug. 14, 2017). The Memorandum declares at the outset that China has "taken actions related to
intellectual property, innovation, and technology, that may . . . negatively affect American
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Four days later, the USTR initiated such an investigation.49
China is familiar with the U.S. unilateral actions under Section 301 and its
affiliated parts of the 1974 Trade Act. In 1991, the USTR initiated such an
investigation with respect to certain acts, policies, and practices of China that,
according to the United States, "deny adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights."o Throughout the 1990s, the USTR and the Chinese
government engaged closely on these issues.
The USTR's 2018 Section 301 investigation, which preliminarily concluded
several months before the statutory deadline with the issuance of an extensive
report by the USTR on March 22, 2018,52 was not limited to cyber-enabled activity
from China directed toward the United States. The investigation also reviewed
Chinese laws and regulations that require U.S. businesses to share valuable
technical information with Chinese authorities to invest or operate in China.
Further, as noted, the investigation process under Section 301 invites comments
from the public on the topic. A public hearing was held on October 10, 2017, in
which the USTR and other agencies received information from the private sector
on the extent of Chinese activity." Although the USTR concluded that China's
activities rose to the level of the statute, the U.S. government was still considering
at the time this Comment goes to print the scope of the remedy to be applied. The
range of remedies that the government chooses to employ in this process will test
the utility of the U.S. unilateral instruments against malicious state-sponsored
cyber activity.
A strong op-ed from the former director of national intelligence and the
former commander of the United States Cyber Command and the National
Security Agency followed the President's August 2017 announcement.5 4 In their
column, Director Dennis Blair and Commander Keith Alexander asserted that the
effort by the Trump administration was long overdue and that China has been
economic interests."
49. USTR Announces Initiation of Section 301 Investigation of China, OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Aug. 18, 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/201 7 /august/ustr-announces-initiation-section.
50. Notice of Initiation of Investigation under Section 302(b)(2)(A) of the Trade Act of
1974, 56 Fed. Reg. 24877, 24878 (May 31, 1991).
51. See generally WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CHINA-U.S. TRADE
ISSUES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf.
52. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO
CHINA'S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%2OFINAL.PDF.
53. Notice of Initiation of Investigation; Hearing; and Request for comments, 82 Fed. Reg.
40213 (Aug. 24, 2017).
54. Dennis C. Blair & Keith Alexander, Opinion, China's Intellectual Property Theft Must
Stop, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/opinion/china-us-
intellectual-property-trump.html. Joel Brenner raised the alarm long ago, as did others. See, e.g.,
Joel Brenner, The New Industrial Espionage, AM. INTEREST (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.the-
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engaged in a "decades-long assault on the intellectual property of the United States
and its allies."5 But while Blair and Alexander supported the President's move,
trade experts had a different reaction. Jim Bacchus, former chairman of the
Appellate Body of the WTO, made public statements suggesting that the United
States should use the WTO for an action against China with economic implications
rather than unilateral actions. Noting that it would be challenging to do so,
Bacchus commented that such an action would benefit from an international
imprimatur.17
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE USE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
TOOLS TO ADDRESS STATE CYBER ACTIVITIES
While the efforts of the Trump administration to seek to apply existing
international economic tools to combat state-sponsored cyber activity is a step in
the right direction, more can be done and much remains to be seen.
First, thus far, the United States has focused on China given China's well-
known conduct in using cyber means to obtain sensitive business information from
foreign businesses. Unlike other areas of international law, international economic
law is an area in which China is active and responsive. For this reason, testing
these tools on China makes good sense. Policymakers across the U.S. government
should continue to invest resources in the use of international economic institutions
for addressing Chinese state cyber activity.
But, second, U.S. application of just one potential trade enforcement
mechanism (Section 301) is not enough with respect to scope (China only), and it
remains too early to evaluate. More should be done to think creatively about how
this mechanism can be deployed against other actors, where appropriate, for other
cyber economic activity as the Section 301 action continues to evolve. A full
evaluation will be necessary following the USTR's implementation of remedies in
response to its March 2018 report.
Third, policymakers should consider multilateral and plurilateral tools either
in addition to or in place of the unilateral tools. In respect of cyber activity, the
strongest legal weapons should be deployed.
Policymakers should consider adding express provisions to free trade
agreements and bilateral investment treaties that can accommodate claims about
economic harms through cyber activities. This option would create specialized
mechanisms with a mandate to police this type of activity with the enforcement
authority to impose trade sanctions where necessary. The provisions could also
provide opportunities for experts in cyber activity to serve as panel members
together with trade or investment experts or for such experts to be appointed
specially for review of technical evidence. A dispute settlement system built into
55. Blair & Alexander, supra note 54.
56. See, e.g., James Bacchus, Opinion, How to Take on China Without Starting a Trade
War, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-s-doesnt-have-to-take-on-
china-alone-1502904996.
57. Id.
[32.2124
BEYOND NORMS
forthcoming agreements would be consistent with congressional interest and
international norms, and would provide a neutral forum for resolving such issues
thereby promoting the rule of law in both economic and cyber contexts. Economic
and cyber issues have multiple points of intersection. Managing those intersections
requires further legal development.
The use of a standing dispute body or arbitration panels created under
standing trade instruments would help depoliticize cyber economic issues in a way
that also can lead to effective enforcement of international obligations. Making a
clear statement as to the prohibition of cyber economic espionage and related
activity in enforceable trade instruments would be the first and next step to
successfully applying these tools.
V. CONCLUSION
As international lawyers, we can too easily dismiss collective action options
for deterrence in the absence of an international body dedicated to the subject.
However, in recent history, states are accustomed to creating new institutions to
address new threats or old problems with new interest. This Comment has sought
to use existing international organizations to achieve the same. At a minimum,
adding international economic institutions to a playbook designed to fight
malicious state-sponsored cyber activity is prudent given their chances for success
in changing state behavior when seemingly very little else will.
2018] 125
126 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. [32.2
